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Introduction
Violence in schools: Expanding the dialogue
Stephanie Urso Spina
• A new handgun is sold every thirteen seconds in the
United States.1
• Every half hour a child is killed or wounded by a
bullet.2
• Every six hours in America a child between ten and
nineteen years old commits suicide with a handgun.3
• Each day, almost two thousand children, or one child
every thirteen seconds, is reported as abused or
neglected.4
• Three million crimes occur on or near schools every year;
sixteen thousand per school day, or one every six seconds.5
• For school-age youth, the chances of being a victim of a
violent crime are greater than being hurt in a car
accident.6
• Between twenty-five and thirty-five thousand murders are
committed in this country each year—over ten thousand are
the result of domestic violence.7
• Homicide is the leading cause of death for African
American and Latino males under age twenty-five, and the
second leading cause of death nationally for all youth
under age twenty-five.8
• In 1993, more African American children under age nine
died from gun violence than police officers or American
soldiers killed in the line of duty during the same twelve
months.9
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• Recent research finds that one-third of urban children
interviewed had witnessed a violent death10 and almost
three-quarters knew someone who had been shot.11
• About three million violent crimes are reported in the
United States each year.12
• Every year, 2,000 deaths, 1,412,700 serious injuries, and
18,000 serious disabilities are known to result from child
abuse.13
• A woman is battered every fifteen seconds.14
• There are, at minimum, 150,000 rapes of women and
children reported annually in the United States; more than
400 each day, 17 every hour, or 1 every three-and-a-half
minutes. Estimates that include unreported rapes
conservatively estimate the annual figure to be closer to
630,000.15
These statistics are not offered to sensationalize the
issues, to obscure the brutality they enumerate, or to numb one
into hopelessness or apathy, but rather to underscore the
devastatingly high number of children, teens, parents, families,
and communities who must live with the reality of what these
numbers represent in human terms. Yet, while we read and hear
about rampant rape, robberies, drugs, and shootings, many of us
have become desensitized to their human dimensions and
underlying messages. Like much of the general public, social
scientists, educators, and others who work with youth often have
great difficulty understanding the lives of disenfranchised
students. Many of us, in part because we are professionals, have
not been subject to the powerful subcultures that seduce our
students with false promises and futile dreams in a world that
makes their fruition improbable if not impossible. Similarly,
many of us are unaware of the insidious level of violence that
is poverty, of the despair and nihilism that is informed,
shaped, and reproduced by the very fabric of our society—a
situation that demands that we go beyond simply condemning
violence and blaming schools.
Censuring Schools
Schools have long been the scapegoat16 for society’s ills,
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while, at the same time, school systems in the inner city are
hardest hit by the ills of society. This is not meant to absolve
schools from responsibility nor to underestimate the critical
value of the school’s role in children’s lives, but to recognize
the interdependence between schooling and the sociocultural and
political reality of the society within which schools exist.
Americans tend to view public schools as agencies of
socialization as well as education. Public schooling, as we now
know it, along with imprisoning “juvenile delinquents,” was a
response to the rapid rise of industrialization and the first
waves of mass immigration at the end of the nineteenth
century.17 At that time, the established prototype for all human
service institutions was the asylum,18 and the paragon of
progress and productivity was the factory. Schools purposely
combined the model of the factory with those institutions
designed to house the sick, the indigent, and convicted
criminals in order to better assimilate the diverse population19
into their “proper” places in the hegemonic social order.20 This
“social efficiency” model lingers today in the design of school
buildings and curricula as well as in the widespread assumption
that it is the schools’ responsibility to solve social problems.
The endurance of this model and its effects contribute to
the absurdity that, while schools are supposedly part of the
solution, our educational model itself fosters practices that
may themselves be a form of violence.21 Even “normalized” school
practices intended to improve academic performance may actually
harm overwhelmingly poor minority students.22 These include
tracking,23 style of pedagogy, curricular and testing biases,
and other “literacies of power.”24 For example, Jean Anyon’s
work demonstrates how textbooks are often microcosms of white,
middle-class interests and situations even when minority
characters are featured.25 Yet these alienating texts are the
bases for learning and evaluation. The National Curriculum
Standards epitomizes the enforcement of dominant cultural values
and practices that view difference as a problem to be cured,
especially in vilified "disordered" or "violent" spaces like
inner city schools.26 Inconsistent or unfair enforcement of
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arbitrary or oppressive rules, overcrowded classes, and the
retention of uncaring or hostile teachers are other ways schools
harm students.27 Labeling, stereotyping, and similar
stigmatizing wonts may also promote divisions along racial,
ethnic, linguistic, and economic lines as well as precipitate
school-specific violence.28
Division by oversimplified, oppositionally constructed
taxonomies are a common strategy or means of ideological
control.29 Foucault argues that such “dividing practices”
objectify the individual by labeling him in oppositional terms
that reflect societal assessments of intellect, health, and
criminality (e.g., dangerous/harmless, normal/abnormal, us/them,
straight/gay, white/black).30 As a nation, we “learn” to use
such discursive "violence" to simultaneously discount and
spectacularize violence and victims by virtue of their age, sex,
color, income, or language. They are devalued by a system that
manipulates public sentiment via “spin doctors” who employ
euphemistic doublespeak to divert responsibility from the
perpetrator to the victim. Politicians thrive on campaigns built
around the imagery of juvenile and racialized crime. They drive
the bandwagon that demonizes youth,31 that makes a spectacle of
students,32 that violates basic human rights.
All of these discourses are based on surveillance
techniques and practices that divide students as a group as well
as individuals. The legacy of social control, not education,
dominates the agenda of schools. Schools generally respond to an
upsurge in violence through the use of symbols of control and
authority. The omnipresence of metal detectors, guards,
“security” cameras, and the like promote both a relentless
awareness of possible danger and a false sense of safety. School
officials claim the huge number of confiscated weapons indicates
they are reducing violence when, in fact, even the $28 million
expenditure to install metal detectors in New York City public
schools in the 1980s has done nothing to curtail the problem33
and has contributed to the creation of an even more insidious
gendered form of violence. Jennifer McCormick describes how
hand-held metal detectors pass over teenage bodies as students
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are required to stand with their legs apart and their hands
outstretched.34 She illustrates how this routine becomes
explicitly sexual when the students are female and male security
guards are present. One girl McCormick interviewed in a New York
City public high school describes the experience this way:
I hate it. I don’t feel right....I have to put my hands out
(she places her hand on the table in front of us, fingers
are stretched apart). I have to stand straight for a few
minutes, legs apart, my hands outstretched in front of me.
I have to take my bracelets off, take everything out of my
pockets. It's very uncomfortable, I feel embarrassed
amongst everybody else. It's not good. It's not a
productive way to start off school. I hate it. I don't feel
right. I feel out of my element. In a way they are trying
to take my shield away because with the scanning, they are
looking for something I may have concealed....I feel like
they are trying to know my body....I hear the comments or I
see the looks from the guards to other girls. And through
that and through the scanning, they get closer than they
can ever get in a normal way....I’m sure they’re getting
off on it....I just don’t like it. I don’t like it. I don’t
like it.35
Yet, despite the humiliation and invasiveness of metal detectors
and electronic scanners, students express the desire for
security, often enduring psychic and emotional pain in exchange
for what they believe to be protection from more physical and
fatal forms of violence.
In truth, and contrary to what news reports and political
propaganda would have us think, schools themselves are
comparatively safe havens. In 1998, for example, there were
approximately 20 million middle- and high-school students in the
United States. Fewer than a dozen of these students killed
someone at school. Nationally, youth violence comprises only 13
percent of the violent crime and 8 percent of murders reported
by the FBI. This is not to downplay the tragedy of these events
or to minimize the expectation that schools should be
absolutely, not relatively, safe, but to underscore how
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disproportionate the level of fear and resources surrounding
this “epidemic” of “violence in schools” is when viewed in light
of the larger picture.
Consider, for example, a 1994 national survey of hospital
emergency rooms which reported treating a total of 900,000
injuries resulting from violent crime. These injuries were eight
times more likely (410,000) to occur in the home and five times
more likely (246,000) to occur in the workplace than in schools
(55,000).36 Consider that of the two to three thousand children
and youths murdered each year, 90 percent are under age twelve
and 30 percent are aged twelve through seventeen.37 Three out of
every four are killed by parents or caretakers, not by other
juveniles. In comparison, forty-two percent of childhood deaths
are caused by car crashes and other accidents.38 We should not
ignore the threat to youth from drinking, driving, and
unprotected sex because it does not provoke national outrage,
because it does not threaten our collective unconscious, because
it does not provide emotional jolts on the 6:00 news. Yet, from
the executive branch to the local level, from The New York Times
to CNN, shootings by students are what attract attention and
serve to camouflage far greater acts of violence.
The omission of such disturbing data from the discourse on
violence misleadingly supports those who, like President
Clinton, assert that today’s grown-ups “confront a younger
generation desensitized to brutality by its own ‘culture’ of
violent media and seemingly unable or unwilling to take
responsibility for their actions."39 Legislation is another ploy
used to detract attention from adult malfeasance. In 1997, for
example, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill to
“crack down” on juvenile crime by rewarding states that
prosecute more underage perpetrators as adults.40 As this volume
illustrates, it is the dominant adult society, with its elected
officials casting the most stones, that commits the most crimes
against the most people and refuses to take responsibility for
them. It is safer to blame youths who can’t vote and whose
voices remain unheard.
Policy makers reinforce and promote this delusional
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perspective. For example, the sixth National Education Goal
called for every school in America to be free of drugs and
violence by the year 2000.41 The Safe Schools Act of 1994
allocated $20 million in twenty one-year grants to reinforce
existing school safety programs. However, there is little if any
evidence that such violence prevention programs work and some
have actually worsened the very situation they were implemented
to improve.42 Rather than increasing security or technology,
more fundamental issues need to be addressed—issues that lie at
the very core of our society.
American schools, like American cities, are segregated
racially, politically, and economically. Ethnic and racial
minorities have always been disproportionately represented in
the incidence and depiction of violence. It is not a coincidence
that this is the case when one examines these data in the
context of social, and cultural factors.
Socioeconomic Factors
We are increasingly a nation with sharpening divisions between
the “haves” and “have-nots.” The top 5 percent of our citizens
control over 20 percent of the country’s wealth, while the 20
percent at the bottom of the economic ladder struggle to survive
on less than 4 percent. The richest 1 percent of households own
48 percent of the nation’s wealth.43 As of the mid-1990s, the
income of those in the top 20 percent of U. S. families was more
than eleven times as much as the bottom 20 percent. During 1997,
the Census Bureau reported that more than 35.5 million Americans
lived in poverty, meaning they earned less than $8,183 a year if
they were single, or $16,400 for a family of four. Another 12
million had annual earnings 25 percent above the poverty
threshold.44
Even more striking is the stark inequality in the economic
condition of America’s children.45 At over 20 percent and
climbing, the child poverty rate in the United States is far
higher than in other countries (e.g., below 4 percent in Sweden,
Belgium, Denmark, and Finland)—even relatively poor ones (e.g.,
Ireland has about a 12 percent child poverty rate). The closest
figures are from Canada and Australia, at about 14 percent,
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which, not insignificantly, also accompany rates of lethal
violence comparatively higher than Europe, though still
substantially lower than the United States.46 In 1976, about 28
percent of American children lived in families with income less
than half the poverty level. By 1994, 44 percent did, including
well over half of poor black children.47 On any given night,
approximately 200,000 children are homeless. Children under
three are consistently worse off than older children and far
worse off in the United States than in any other country. (For
example, the U.S. poverty rate for the youngest children is
almost 50 percent higher than the next highest rates in Britain
and Canada and about three times as high as Germany, four times
as high as France and Sweden, and almost eleven times as high as
the Netherlands.48 Nor, despite pointed political posturing,
does this represent a lack of effort on the part of the parental
poor. Sixty percent of all poor children under the age of three
have at least one employed parent. This includes 70 percent of
poor white children, 60 percent of poor Hispanic children, and
50 percent of poor black children.49 More than 40 percent of
single mothers with a child under the age of three work full- or
part-time. But these jobs do not provide a living wage and are
further limited by a lack of benefits and available community
support services such as child and health care. Repeated
failures to pass federal initiatives that would support the
needs and rights of children, while spending tax dollars on
incentives to help the rich get richer or to support ludicrous
and vindictive personal attacks against one’s political
opponents, starkly dramatizes the U.S. government’s neglect of
its neediest citizens.50
Virtually every other post industrial nation provides some
form of child care for three- to five-year-olds as well as paid
leaves for parents.51 The United States is the only
postindustrial nation without a national health system to
deliver accessible, high quality preventive and prenatal health
care. Infant mortality rates in the United States have been
steadily increasing over the past thirty years. The United
States now has the fourth highest infant mortality rate of all
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industrialized countries (ranking below all except Greece,
Portugal, and Turkey).52
The situation is exacerbated by basic principles of our
Darwinian market economy. Capitalist values of avarice and
egocentricity undermine social cohesion by promoting individual
competition and consumption over community values and productive
work. In market societies, strong labor movements or truly
democratic political representation are nonexistent. People who
need it most are deprived of the conceptual framework, the
collective consciousness, the cultural capital53 to challenge
the forces of violence.54
Thirty years ago, one in five city residents lived below
poverty level. Ten years ago it was more than one-third and
growing.55 By 1991, the population of major U.S. cities averaged
70 percent racial ethnic minorities and over 43 percent of all
American poor, including 80 percent of all African American
poor.56 Yet, adjusting for inflation, federal aid to cities was
cut 60 percent between 1980 and 1992.57 The mass exodus of
businesses from cities leaves urban areas with only a minimal
number of highly stratified low-wage, temporary jobs without
benefits and highly technological top-level professional jobs
accessible only to an elite population.58
Politics, Race, and Class
The inequities noted in the previous section are not surprising
when one considers their political context. Suburbanites, who
include less than 10 percent minorities,59 cast the majority of
votes in local and national elections, so predominantly minority
inner-city residents elect fewer state and national legislators
to represent their interests. It is not that minorities do not
care, or do not vote. It is a function of our electoral process.
The increasingly homogeneous two-party system, geographically
defined districting, and gerrymandering, are only a few ways
minority voters are discouraged from participating in the
political process and excluded from democracy. Although they
begin as strong participants in the electoral system, minorities
soon learn that their vote does not carry the same weight as a
white vote in “winner-take-all majority rule.”60 Because of
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these and other injustices, Lani Guinier, in her book, The
Tyranny of the Majority,61 argues forcefully for a change to
cumulative voting, which is not biased like the present system
is:
It [cumulative voting] gives each voter the same number of
votes as there are seats or options to vote for, and they
can distribute their votes in any combination to reflect
their preferences...it allows voters to organize themselves
on whatever basis they wish.62
In this way, everyone’s preferences would be counted equally.
Voting would focus on political interests rather than
geographical location and it would become far more difficult to
maintain the gross inequities of race-conscious districting.
In contrast to the 90 percent white suburban schools, over
three-quarters of students in inner-city schools are African
American or Latino.63 Yet, although the need for resources is
greater than in the more affluent suburbs, urban school budgets
across the nation are one-tenth those of suburban schools.64
School buildings are literally falling apart and supplies are
few.65 This is not a recent development. James B. Conant, in his
1961 book, Slums and Suburbs: A Commentary on Schools in
Metropolitan Areas, raised similar issues.66 Thirty years later,
Jonathan Kozol’s best-selling book, Savage Inequalities, brought
national attention to even more severe economic and educational
disparities.67 Not coincidentally, urban schools continue to
deteriorate as the minority population increases.
Recent research confirms that instruction in inner-city
schools is frequently substandard.68 In New York City alone, 66
percent of all students who attend high school fail to graduate.
For Latino students the rate is 80 percent, for African
Americans, 72 percent, for whites, 50 percent. Statistics from
other cities are equally grim.69 Teachers, “low standards,”
and/or lack of discipline are not to blame. (See the last
chapter of this volume, for a discussion of those issues).
Social class is the greatest predictor of who drops out—or gets
"pushed out" of school. The failure of schools and society to
recognize that this behavior is not just reactive but proactive
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guarantees that these problems will continue. As Willis’s70
classic study with British youth showed, delinquency is not a
mechanical response to social disadvantage but active resistance
to the dominant tradition by the production of alternative or
oppositional practices. This resistance is rooted in the social
relationships of the students’ communities and is not
necessarily reducible to capitalist pressures and processes.71
Dropping out is not merely the result of alienation but is an
assertive rejection of the system and what it represents.72
One reason rejection of the system takes forms of responses
like not voting and dropping out of school instead of a more
openly aggressive stand (possibly even taking steps toward a
popular revolution), is because mechanisms of the class system
have “always been buffered by an even more discriminatory caste
system (of whites vs. blacks).”73 Although there are more than
three times as many non-African American, largely white poor
than there are African American poor, poverty is generally not
considered quite as damaging and demoralizing to poor whites
because “blacks have always been there to occupy a position
lower in the social scale than even the poorest whites.”74 There
is
a vested interest on the part of both rich and poor whites
to maintain the caste system of discrimination against
blacks, For the rich, it has been a cheap way (both
financially and morally) to continue to possess and control
a disproportionate share of the national wealth and income.
And poor American whites have let themselves be distracted
from paying attention to how badly they are being
discriminated against by the class system, by the fact that
there is always a group they can look down upon...that in
turn buys peace for the rich, who can continue to
monopolize most of the nation’s wealth and income without
having to be bothered by any significant threats to their
privileges.” 75
Racism is the “weapon of choice” used by the ruling class to
keep the working class divided.76 The unity of the working class
across color lines is
“feared more than almost
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anything else by Corporate America which uses every form of
coercion, manipulation, and violence” to keep the working class
from joining forces to fight their common enemy.77 Even Malcolm
X, after a pilgrimage to Mecca near the end of his life,
realized that “it isn’t the American white man who is a racist,
but it’s the American political, economic, and social atmosphere
that automatically nourishes a racist psychology in the white
man.”78 It has been argued by many that racism is so deeply
internalized that [most] whites are not even aware of its
existence or how far they will go to keep it that way.79 As
Spina and Tai explain:
Not seeing race is predicated on not seeing White as a
race....Ignoring the racial construction of Whiteness
reinscribes its centrality and reinforces its privileged
and oppressive position as normative. Thus, Whiteness
becomes a non-race, invisible to those that would seek to
analyze race and racism, thereby giving it more power, more
privilege, and more impunity. The non-racialization of
Whiteness restricts the ability of minorities to point out
racism and gives the dominant White culture more freedom
from criticism in the practice of racism.80
Racism is so normalized in this country that in surveys,81
newspapers, and on national television,82 white Americans, and
some (more affluent) black Americans, repeatedly express the
belief that racism is no longer a problem in the United States.
Why is this view, so at odds with reality, gaining support?
Perhaps one contributing factor is what Americans are not
allowed to know.83 The U.S. government has selectively repressed
data which would reveal the blatantly racist “nature, location,
and dimensions of violence in this country.”84 Since 1960, for
example, when the U.S. Public Health Service began to calculate
age-adjusted death rates separately for blacks and whites, the
death rate for blacks has been consistently about 280 more
deaths per 100,000 than whites.85 In comparison, the national
homicide rate is about 10 per 100,000.86 Yet, the latter is
positioned as a “national emergency, over which presidential
elections are won and lost,”87 and the former remains buried in
12

relatively obscure government publications. If this is not
“proof” enough,
Any doubt that the excess death rate among blacks is a
function of the social and economic structure of our
society is put to rest by epidemiological studies. Several
investigations88 have shown that high blood pressure, for
example, is common among American, West Indian, South
African, and other urbanized African blacks, but infrequent
among rural Africans (that is, those least exposed to the
social and economic structure of colonialism and white
domination).89
Furthermore, some suggest that contemporary conservative
politicians are systematically encouraging whites to blame
immigrants and poor ethnic minorities for economic
difficulties.90 As Kristeva explains, such exclusionist
discourse, where violence is turned against the “foreigner,” the
“refugee,” the “immigrant,” the “other,” normalizes a system
based on one group against all external others; i.e., a
pervasive and violent form of racism.91 Using rhetoric that
blames affirmative action for the loss of “white” jobs and
fosters a belief that “the deterioration of society is the fault
of immigrants and people of color,” conservatives both divert
attention from the increasing inequality reflected in the
widening gap between the upper socioeconomic groups and the rest
of the populace and simultaneously divided traditional
coalitions of labor, ethnic minorities, and women.”92 President
Clinton has publicly blamed the victims of poverty and racism
for their situation, saying that if they would “pull themselves
up by the bootstraps” and “put an end to crime in their own
communities,” things would get better.93 With much patriotic
flourish, an ethos of callousness is legitimized under the
rubric of competition, survival of the fittest, and the
“American” way.
Despite invoking ideals of democracy, traditional “American”
values are selectively and strategically applied by those in
power, especially when defining criminality.94 James Gilligan
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offers one of the most telling examples of this bias:
It is remarkable to me how seldom people recognize the
extent to which many of the criminals today are
contemporary versions of our own ancestors. For example...I
vary between being amused and bemused by the moral
indignation with which some politicians who happen to be
Boston Brahmins denounce the scandalous behavior of young
male drug dealers. These young men are, of course, classic
examples of capitalist entrepreneurs, whom one would think
would be extolled by these Bostonians as role models for
their peers. They are, after all, making fortunes by their
business activities, with tremendous returns on relatively
small investments, and they often manage to save and invest
their considerable earnings as conscientiously as did the
Brahmins’ own ancestors. The fact is that the ancestors of
the latter group made the fortunes on which their
descendants are now living (comfortably enough that they do
not need to deal drugs) by means of the seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century equivalents of drug-dealing such as
slave-trafficking, opium-smuggling, rum-running, and
killing.95
Gilligan is careful to point out that this is not meant to
trivialize the devastation of illicit drug abuse but to put the
construction of criminality in perspective. A Washington, D.C.,
high school student, reacting to the simplistic “Just Say No to
Drugs” campaign, gives us an even harder dose of reality: “I
make a hundred bucks an hour selling drugs. What does the
President want me to do, work at McDonald’s for the minimum
wage?”96
Similarly, present-day upper-class economic crimes such as
embezzlement, price fixing, fraud, professional and business
malpractice, and corruption (not to mention the legalized crime
of tax benefits for the wealthy at the expense of the vast
majority of Americans), far outweigh the economic costs of
lower-class crimes. Yet, white-collar criminals constitute only
a small fraction of the prison population. Penal sanctions are
primarily applied against crimes of need, not crimes of greed.
14

This situation is sarcastically summarized by Anatole France:
“The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as
the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to
steal bread.”97
Street Gangs
Another way the American aristocracy feeds off the marginalized
is manifested in the paradoxes of gang culture.98 Although gangs
each have distinctive identities, they tend to be treated as a
homogeneous "problem" in ways reminiscent of the stereotyping of
certain racial and ethnic groups.
What images come to mind when you think of a gang? The
typical picture is a group of dark-skinned male minority youths,
dressed in similar clothing, swaggering together down school
corridors or neighborhood streets and perceived as threatening
to “outsiders.” AS Cummings and Monti point out:
We would have more difficulty conceiving of gangs as young
men strutting through high school corridors while dressed
out in identical team jackets or a set of college students
being formally initiated with secret rituals into a group
dedicated to a “brotherhood,” carousing, and intermittent
outbursts of vandalism. Fraternities and football teams are
not “gangs” in the commonly accepted sense of that term;
but they do exhibit certain traits that frequently are
associated with gangs.99
The difference is that crimes condemning gangs are considered
merely “boys will be boys” antics when committed by higher-class
“gangs” sporting Greek letters or football team mascots as their
colors. This is not meant to excuse gang violence (of any type)
or to argue that we should dismiss violent behavior as a ritual
of male bonding (which we most definitely should not),100 but to
underscore the variations in our attributions of culpability
both across and within these groups.
Similarly, the intolerance of personal disrespect that is
part of the “street code” has been highly publicized and widely
condemned. Yet the gentlemen’s “code of honor” that dominated
the mannered culture of the antebellum South was considered a
respectable way to respond to insults. When John Dickinson, a
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Nashville lawyer, made offensive comments about Andrew Jackson’s
wife, Jackson, the future president, shot and killed the man
(who also happened to be his political opponent). And every
student of American history learns about the famous duel between
Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr. When practiced by those at
the top of the Southern caste system, revenge in the form of
ritualized and cold-blooded killing has always been an accepted
way to solve problems.
It is important to realize, despite media-manipulated
perceptions, even among the most “violent” street gangs, violent
behavior is relatively rare.101 The gangs Padilla works with,
for example, “participate in a violent world,” but “view what
they’re doing as expressions of resistance, freedom, and
election” and “as superior to the way of life and occupational
choices of their ‘conformist peers’ or ‘straight youth.’”102
Gang leaders share profits with other gang members and all see
their economic welfare as tied to the gang.103 Sullivan’s
research also highlights gang members’ awareness and positioning
of crime vis-à-vis the exigencies of a market economy. He writes
that the young men in these studies104 ironically
spoke of their criminal activities as “getting over” and
“getting paid,” terms that refer directly...to economic
motivation and reflect the perception of a social structure
of restricted opportunity. “Getting paid” equates crime
with work. “Getting over” means beating the system, a
rigged system in which one is unlikely to succeed by
competing according to the rules.105
Besides being blamed for increased crime, gangs also take
the rap for crimes of commodification that play both sides
against them. For example, on one hand, antigraffiti campaigns
criminalize those who use the walls of the projects to
communicate106 while, on the other hand, downtown gallery owners
get rich from the work of those few graffiti artists they
charitably “rescue” to paint in lofts instead of gutters,
providing trendy decor for their upscale patrons to signal their
financial status and cultural savvy. The co-optation of street
gang symbols by fashion, music, and media also add a capitalist
16

cachet to gang symbols and legends while separating them from
contextual economic and social conditions. They become either
superficial, disposable possessions of wealthier youth who can
afford them or an attempt to gain, by association, some of the
adult recognition and fear, if not respect, of one of the few
groups in their age cohort that has managed to do that. The use
of gang symbols by upper classes can trivialize gang culture and
further marginalize gangs.107 But it can also speak to the
tenuous position of all young people in the social order.
Gendered Violence
High levels of violence are not confined to urban schools with
predominantly African American and Latino/a populations.
Violence is also increasing in suburban and rural schools,
especially among white male students. Although not necessarily
economically disadvantaged, white male students can be
marginalized in other ways. Those who do not conform to accepted
roles and expectations are often alienated from the dominant
culture and at the bottom of the social hierarchy of schools
(nerds, geeks, fags, etc.). These “minority” students are
indoctrinated with almost the same message as inner-city
students: pretty girls, strong boys, thin, rich, smart kids are
the ones who matter.108 Add “white” to the list and it’s the
urban version.
Shooting sprees by middle-class white teenage males in
small towns and suburbs in twenty-five states captured national
and international headlines during the 1997–98 and 1998–99 school
years.109 In contrast, killers and victims of color and/or from
the inner cities garner no such media interest. No specially
trained counselors are sent to help the predominantly African
American and Latino/a students in inner-city schools cope with
their trauma. No emergency crews arrive with spackle and paint
to remove bullet holes and other signs of violence from city
schools. In fact, after the 1999 shooting at Colorado's 98
percent white Columbine High School, newspapers featured short
biographies about each of the twelve white students who had been
murdered. The one African American student who had been killed
was not eulogized. Instead, the papers printed a much shorter
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story about how angry his father was. Although all parents of
these victims must have been understandably angry, only the
black male parent’s rage was displayed in the press, while his
dead son was not memorialized like the white victims were.110
This exploitive construction of their identities (or erasing of
identity, in the case of the son) as (negatively) different from
or “other” than those of the white victims and their families
was not accidental, although it may not have been conscious. It
was representative of the more pervasive, insidious discourses
of structural racism and implies that the dominant white culture
and experience is the norm.
Although racism dominates the American subconscious, sexual
harassment and improprieties dominate the American
consciousness. Try, as O’Toole and Schiffman urge us, to “think
about the most consuming events of the last decade, those that
grabbed the attention of the public through news headlines and
court television and dominated daily conversation.”111 Think
about the O. J. Simpson trial;112 “ethnic cleansing” and other
atrocities committed by the Serbs against Albanians in
Bosnia;113 the rape of a twelve-year-old Okinawa schoolgirl by
three U.S. servicemen. All of these acts of violence share a
common link: They were perpetrated by males, acting individually
or in groups, “for whom violence and violation are rational
solutions to perceived problems ranging from the need to inflate
one’s sexual self-esteem to denigrating rivals in war to
boosting a country’s GNP.”114 Our culture rewards men for
practicing violence “in virtually any sphere of activity by
money, admiration, recognition, respect, and the genuflection of
others honoring their sacred and proven masculinity. In male
culture, police are heroic and so are outlaws; males who enforce
standards are heroic and so are those who violate them.”115
Brutal acts by American sports heroes and foreign armies
dominate the landscape of gendered violence in the media, but
they represent only the smallest fraction of violent acts
against women and of the dangers women face on a daily basis.116
Even the language used to describe violence against women
contributes to its perpetuity. The term “battered woman,” for
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example, is deceptive because the harm done to her becomes an
adjective, which implies it is an attribute of the woman and not
something someone did to her.117 This is particularly
distressing because battering is the leading cause of injury to
women in the United States. Similarly, using the term “domestic”
violence to denote family violence minimizes its cruelty and
masks the gender bias of what used to be known as “wife
beating,” or, in the words of Frances Power Cobbe, an Irish
reformer and feminist of the late 1800s, “wife torture.”118
Cobbe’s words, as Ann Jones notes, remind us of scenes from
Charles Dickens and Thomas Hardy; from D. H. Lawrence,
Dostoevsky, and Émile Zola; from Doris Lessing, Toni Morrison,
Alice Munro, and Alice Walker; Wife torture
conjure(s) the scenes between beatings: the sullen husband,
withdrawn and sulking, or angry and intimidating, dumping
dinner on the floor, throwing the cat against the wall,
screaming, twisting a child’s arm, needling, nagging,
manipulating, criticizing the bitch, the cunt who never
does anything right, who’s ugly and stupid, who should keep
her mouth shut, who should spread her legs now, who should
be dead, who will be if she’s not careful.119
“Domestic violence,” it may be argued, is a more comprehensive
term that is not only neutral in terms of gender but also sexual
preference. That assumes violence in homosexual couples is the
same thing as in heterosexual relationships. It is not. Our
culture clearly supports, if not encourages, wife beating. This
gives it a legitimacy that differentiates it from abuse within
gay and lesbian relationships. On the other hand, the
marginalization of homosexuals trivializes violence in their
communities and ignores its victims, despite the fact that an
estimated 25 percent of all gay men and women in intimate
relationships are victims of “domestic” abuse. Using genderneutral terminology, despite the real problem of “domestic”
violence committed by women against women, women against men,
and men against men, the assailant in almost all cases of
violence, heterosexual and homosexual, is a man.120
The term “domestic violence” ostensibly includes children,
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but they are often its forgotten victims. Aside from the
increased danger of children being physically abused in violent
homes, they are almost always psychologically and emotionally
abused. A reported minimum of 3.3 million children a year
witness violent parental abuse ranging from hitting or slapping
to murder. (Because family violence is underreported, the actual
figure is much higher.)121 The problem is compounded because the
combination of inadequate job opportunities and lack of outside
financial and child care support trap women (and their children)
in abusive relationships. Sexual harassment, battering, rape,
murder, sexual abuse of women and children, and other forms of
gender violence are not random events or practices perpetrated
by “other” political regimes and a few celebrities. They are
intrinsic components of America’s heritage and culture.
The Role of Religion
Although separation of church and state is a fundamental
cornerstone of U.S. government, religion has always been in
collusion with politics and vice versa. Martín-Baró,122 makes a
useful and appropriate distinction between vertical religiosity,
which leads to alienation and oppression, and horizontal
religiosity, which leads to empowering critical consciousness
and social liberation. Both can exist individually or in
combination with other religious practices, but the direction
taken reflects its ideological dimension.
Martín-Baró, a Jesuit priest and critical psychologist,
conducted a series of studies in El Salvador which confirmed
that there was a clear connection between religious beliefs and
sociopolitical choices. His analysis found that even though
religion has individual meaning, the ideological milieu provides
the context for how one interprets one’s beliefs. The dominant
western European Christian tradition is one of vertical
religiosity and that, not horizontal religiosity,123 is the
“religion” discussed below.
Historically, when the shift from goddess worship to
patriarchal religions replaced the reciprocal relationship of
nature and humanity with the superiority of man over nature (and
women), the cultural sanction of violence as an expression of
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power and control became the norm.124 Sexism, classism, and
racism are replete in religious texts such as the Torah, Qur’an,
and New Testament. The use of violence was both official and
individual. In the seventh century B.C.E., Josiah ordered the
annihilation of every non-Hebrew Canaanite in order to eradicate
lingering remnants of goddess worship. At “God’s command,”
Joshua led the Hebrews to conquer Palestine by killing every
man, woman and child they encountered.125 Catholic “holy” wars
or crusades sanctioned murder, rape, and other atrocities in the
name of God and church coffers. The 14th-century Roman Catholic
Church authorized the notorious torture of the Inquisition as
warnings to others who might question the authority of the
Church and thereby weaken her political power.
It was also seen as a duty to colonize and Christianize the
“savages” of the world. Ships were sent to the colonies with
armies and missionaries and returned laden with slaves and
treasures wrested from the conquered. Churches and governments
grew rich on the backs of colonialized people by destroying
their cultures, their economy, their spirits, their lives.
Although conquered peoples were often seen as less-than-human,
religions also fostered the belief that humans are inherently
bad—and women even worse. In officially sanctioned versions of
Biblical texts, Eve, after all, is responsible for tempting Adam
to eat the forbidden fruit and thus for their (and our)
expulsion from the Garden of Eden. The stigma of Eve’s sin has
marked all women as less-than-man. From Augustine to Aquinas
(and Aristotle before them), the female is marked as too
emotional and impulsive and thus not “rational” enough, fickle,
weak, deceitful, and generally morally and intellectually
inferior to men.126
Catholicism was the first Christian religion but by no
means was it the most oppressive or influential.127 The
fundamental Calvinist tenet of predestination is perhaps the
strongest contender for that title. Predestination refers to the
belief that people are divided into two groups—the redeemed and
the damned—before they are born and there is no way to change
one’s fate. Because success
is considered a sign of God’s
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grace, people work hard to achieve so they (and others) can be
convinced they are among the saved.128 Those at the top of the
hierarchy can then tautologically justify their position and
behavior by invoking this tenet. In addition to stressing the
evil of idleness and human nature, the Calvinist tradition also
opposed enjoyment and personal luxuries.
The late 17th-century Salem, Massachusetts, witch trials
were but one embodiment of this dogmatic and misogynous
heritage. As Weber has shown, the Calvinist form of radical
individualism that questioned the religious value of poverty and
forbearance became the foundation of capitalism and an
oppressive, militant, self-righteous morality. Today, it is
evident in efforts limiting reproductive rights, in bemoaning
the break-up of the (presumably functional) nuclear family while
forcing even single mothers to abandon their children so they
can work, paying men higher salaries than women who do the same
work, sanctioning injustices in our law enforcement system, and
opposing social justice. In short, it is the agenda of the
conservative government and the “religious” right. It is the
hegemonic ideology.
The heritage of vertical religiosity is not oppressive only
to women and children. It harms men in ways that are sometimes
even more insidious and dangerous. Since male behavior is the
norm, violence and war are not only accepted as normal, but they
are elevated as noble, heroic events. This only makes it more
difficult to see how qualities that define “manhood,” like
emotional detachment, competitiveness, and toughness, can be
detrimental.129 All that matters is winning—whether it means a
hostile corporate takeover that puts thousands out of work,
dropping an atomic bomb on innocent men, women, and children, or
shooting an “enemy” with a handgun.
Guns and Poses
Firearms have figured prominently in U.S. history, and their
continuing presence is often attributed to the country’s strong
cultural sense of its frontier heritage. As Gellert points out,
other countries have a similar frontier tradition (e.g., Canada
and Australia) but have only a fraction of America’s rates of
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gun ownership or gun-related homicide and violence. For example,
the homicide rate among males aged fifteen to twenty-four in the
United States is ten times higher than in Canada, and fifteen
times higher than Australia.130 Australia has one-seventh the
proportionate private handgun ownership of the United States.
Friedman and Fisher attribute this, not to a “frontier” legacy
but, more accurately, to the varying historic dominance of
market culture and institutions between countries such as the
United States and Canada. They argue that it is not a
coincidence that Canada has both more stringent controls over
the sale of guns and a much more generous “welfare state” than
the United States, or that Canada pioneered the kind of
universal medical care system the United States has fiercely and
effectively resisted in the name of a “free market.”131
The United States has the highest rate of nonwar gunrelated homicide in the world. The United States is also the
only industrialized nation that does not effectively regulate
private ownership of firearms,132 even though there are
currently more than 20,000 laws in the United States that deal
with the sale, distribution, and use of firearms. Almost onehalf of all American households have one or more firearms.
Although accurate figures are not available, the American
Medical Association estimates that there are approximately 210
million firearms in the United States, 60 million of which are
handguns.133
The rhetoric that argues “if guns are criminalized only
criminals will have guns” and law-abiding citizens will have no
means to protect themselves is not supported by data. The
majority of U.S. homicides are not committed by those with any
criminal record. Most homicides are the result of a complex
interaction of emotional and societal forces and are not
associated with other felonies or a previous history of crime.
Guns intended to protect against crime are forty-three times
more likely to kill a family member, friend, or acquaintance
than to kill an intruder in self-defense.134 The risk of
domestic homicide in families owning a gun doubles.135 Adults
whose parents owned a gun are twice as likely to own one
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themselves.136 Data also contradict the racist-based fear
exploited by George Bush in his now infamous “Willie Horton”
campaign commercial. The commercial used a mug shot of an
African American with a voice-over that told how he had been
furloughed in Massachusetts and subsequently beat and terrorized
a man and raped his wife in another state. The commercial played
on the common but mistaken belief that violent crime is
disproportionately committed by blacks against white victims.
Although whites are more likely to own guns than blacks, blacks
are three times as likely as whites to be victims of a violent
crime committed with a handgun. More than 90 percent of the
victims of black violence are other blacks.137
The “Constitutional right” argument is similarly divorced
from fact. Even though the second amendment says “the right of
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,” all
U.S. Supreme Court decisions have held that this does not
protect an individual’s right to private gun ownership, despite
the belief to the contrary of 60 percent of Americans.138 What
about the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
(emphasis added)? The fact is guns are a highly profitable,
major American industry in a culture where money matters most.
The National Rifle Association (NRA) is a powerful, well-funded
contributor to select political campaigns and advocate of the
gun industry. The problem—and most important discrepancy in the
data—is that when it comes to firearms, profits are measured in
dollars and costs are measured in lives.
Police Beat
Since July 1991 New York and other U.S. cities have been touting
a downward trend in both violent and property crime. According
to the FBI, national murder and robbery statistics for 1997 show
a decline of 7 percent. However, as evidenced by a Morning
Edition report on National Public Radio (NPR) on November 23,
1998, there is growing concern among the public, as well as
among criminologists, that the figures merely indicate increased
political pressure on police to keep crime rates low. On that
program, Eric Westervelt reported that the New Orleans Office of
Municipal Investigation
found that dozens of crimes in
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the city were altered or downgraded so that tourists would not
be scared away. Westervelt tells of one woman who was stabbed
twelve times while resisting rape by an intruder who attacked
her in her own bed. According to FBI guidelines, the crime
should have been reported as attempted rape and aggravated
assault and battery—a major crime. But New Orleans police
classified the attack simply as an aggravated burglary, avoiding
mention of anything that might appear on the violent crime
reports. In another attack, Westervelt reported, “a man ended up
in the emergency room with stab wounds to his back during a
robbery. That, too, was written up as an aggravated burglary.”
This “creative crime counting” is not restricted to New Orleans
or other favorite tourist destinations. Police commanders in New
York, Boca Raton, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and several other
cities were criticized, demoted, or transferred in 1998 for
similar offenses.
Westervelt also interviewed Jim Fife, a criminologist and
former New York City police officer, who said that crime
statistics were the “worst official statistics in the U.S.” and
that current practices were not without precedent. Pressure to
manipulate statistics comes not only from cities looking to
boost their images, but also because promotions and pay raises
are largely based on crime statistics. According to Fife,
downgrading was common practice when he joined the force in the
early 1960s, and continues to this day. Westervelt reported
that, in 1996 and 1997, the FBI “tossed out” the Philadelphia
crime reports “because they were totally unreliable.” Although
John Timmony, the Philadelphia police commissioner, called the
majority of mistakes “stupid, careless, [or] lazy” unintentional
miscodings, an investigation by the Philadelphia Inquirer found
that statement contradicted by repeated examples of recent
downgrading.
The problem is exacerbated, especially in inner cities,
when citizens fail to report crimes. As Fife explained:
The suburbanite whose car is broken into is alarmed because
this is the first time this has happened and he's paying
enormous taxes and he expects the police to come out with a
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fingerprint kit and solve the problem. The guy in the
inner city to whom that happens knows it ain't gonna
happen, so he doesn't bother reporting it. So almost
certainly crime in the worst parts of the United States is
very much underreported by citizens.
Not responding to alarms in “certain” neighborhoods represents
more than dereliction of duty or a shortage of police officers.
It is just one way the racial bias that pervades police
departments across the country manifests itself. Other ways can
be, unfortunately, far more serious.139 Although all police
officers are not racist, many police departments across the
country tolerate prejudice in their ranks. Racism is the most
blatantly displayed.
On Thursday, February 4, 1999, Amadou “Ahmed” Diallo, an
unarmed twenty-two-year old West African man with no criminal
record, was shot to death at 12:45 a.m. in the vestibule to his
apartment. He was killed by four (white) officers assigned to an
elite plainclothes unit trying to solve a series of rapes and
robberies in the Bronx and Manhattan. Diallo was shot forty-one
times. (The four members of the New York Police Department’s
Street Crime Unit were subsequently indicted on second-degree
murder charges and acquitted.)
The institutionalized racism and brutality of the NYPD had
reached international proportions. Thousands in Guinea,
including top government officials, attended Diallo’s funeral.
The Diallo shooting became the catalyst for a national and
international debate on U.S. police practices and the racial
conflict between urban officers and the communities they patrol.
The president of the United African Congress, Sidique Abubakarr
Wai, charged New York City officials with flagrant disregard for
African lives and condemned their failure to aggressively seek
the murderers of "several dozen Senegalese cabdrivers who have
been killed over the past decade or so."140 Outraged citizens of
all ages, colors, and incomes gathered daily in New York, in
groups ranging in size from a handful to more than 10,000, to
protest police racism and brutality. Demonstrations were also
held in Washington, D.C., and other major cities. On Tuesday,
26

March 28, 1999, hundreds of police officers, nearly all of them
white, marched in the Bronx in support of the four officers who
shot Amadou Diallo, contending that the killing of Mr. Diallo
was a tragedy but not a crime.
On February 25, 2000, a jury cleared the four police
officers of murder, manslaughter, and lesser criminal charges in
the slaying of Amadou Diallo. Public protests followed in
Albany, the Bronx, and elsewhere. Amadou's father, Saikou Diallo
called the change in trial venue from the Bronx to the state
capitol "the second murder" of his son. As this book goes to
press, the NAACP is demanding a federal investigation of the
case and the Diallo family is planning a civil lawsuit against
the city and the officers.141
The police do not deny that minorities are targeted as
suspects. A manual used by the Public Agency Training Council in
Indianapolis even suggests stopping all cars with "Jamaican
paraphernalia, bumper stickers or slogans."142 The police argue
that they stop more blacks because there are more blacks in jail
because blacks commit more crimes. But they fail to recognize
the circularity of this reasoning. It doesn't occur to them that
perhaps there are more blacks in jail because they are so
targeted. They have no way of knowing how many more whites would
be in jail today if they were also stopped or if criteria other
than race were used.
The “profiling” controversy and the use of race and
ethnicity as clues to criminality prompted state and federal
investigations into police behavior across the country.
However, three years earlier, in 1996, Amnesty International
issued a report on “Police Brutality and Excessive Force in the
New York City Police Department.”143 The human rights advocates
documented the disproportionate number of people of color who
were physically abused and sometimes killed, often by shots in
the back, in situations that “did not warrant the use of lethal
force” and were “in violation of police guidelines and
international standards.”144
Also in 1996, a New Jersey judge found state troopers
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engaged in the illegal practice of tageting of minority drivers,
creating a "stark" disparity in which blacks were almost five
times more likely to be stopped than whites. After years of
denial, in April, 1999 (shortly after the Diallo murder and the
massive national public demonstrations against police bias and
brutality that followed), New Jersey's Governor Christine Todd
Whitman, most likely with an eye on the polls, finally
acknowledged that state troopers have disproportionately and
improperly stopped and searched black drivers on the New Jersey
Turnpike in attempts to catch drug dealers and other criminals.
More than 77 percent of all drivers so targeted were members of
a minority group.145 This blatant racism is not unique to the
New York area. Comparable statistics have been found in other
states. In Maryland, for example, the state police agreed as
part of a court settlement to track the race of drivers that
troopers stopped and searched on a stretch of I-95. Only 17
percent of the drivers on that road were black, but more than 70
percent of those searched in the first 20 months were African
American. The “war against crime and drugs” is clearly a race
war.146
The police, it should be noted, are in a difficult if not
impossible position. Their job is to prevent crime, yet the
conditions that are responsible for high crime rates are not
part of the equation. At the core of our law enforcement system
is a belief that people (and especially people of color) are
innately violent and need external social controls to contain
them. By some convoluted form of logic, this legitimizes the use
of violence to “control” violence. The job of police, by
definition, is to maintain order and control, typically through
coercion. The model is one of professionalized “crime fighting,”
reflecting its military roots in history and imagery and
contributing to a “bunker mentality” that feeds suspicions of
“outsiders” and fosters secrecy that minimizes
accountability.147 It applies military concepts (criminals as
enemies) and terminology (war on drugs) as well as solutions
(punishment) to social, political, and economic problems. It is
violence used to protect even greater violence. It is violence
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for social control, not social good. It is violence that
perpetuates a caste system reminiscent of discriminatory law
interpretation, application, and enforcement in which blacks
received decidedly harsher punishments, especially for crimes
against whites.148
Behind Bars
The United States has a larger percentage of its population
incarcerated than any other country. Between 1980 and 1994, the
number of inmates in state and federal prisons and local jails
increased three-fold, from 329,821 to more than 1.8 million,149
including over 95,000 youths.150 The overall American rate of
imprisonment is now ten times as high as that of Japan.
California has the largest prison system, larger than any single
country in the Western industrialized world, and larger than
that of France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Singapore, and
the Netherlands combined.151 For the past twenty years,
California has imprisoned 450 out of every 100,000 juveniles—a
higher percentage of its youth than any other state. Although
whites are the largest racial group in the state, black and
Latino youth are eight times as likely to be arrested as a white
California teen. In Utah, where less than 1 percent of the
state’s residents are black, eight times more black youths are
also held in detention. Half of the inmates in all American
prisons are African American, yet blacks make up only about 10
percent of the total American population. One out of three young
African American (ages eighteen to thirty-five) men in the
United States are in prison or on parole. The percentage of
black men in prison in this country is four times higher than in
South Africa at the height of apartheid.152 Of the 80,000 women
now imprisoned, about 70 percent are nonviolent offenders and 75
percent have children. (Although women make up only a little
more than 7 percent of all U.S. inmates, they are the fastestgrowing segment of the prison population.)153 More than one out
of nine school-age children has one or both parents in prison.
If present policies continue, this number will soon reach one
out of four.154 The National Center for Juvenile Justice reports
that the number of youth age ten through seventeen who are
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arrested and incarcerated for violent crimes could more than
double by the year 2010 if current rates continue.
The exponentially growing prison population is largely due
to four interrelated factors: (1) special interests, (2) the
misguided “war on drugs,” (3) the equally mistaken belief that
“getting tough on crime” will suppress it, and (4) the market
economy.
Firstly, despite the high cost of maintenance (about
$40,000 per inmate per year)155 prison compounds have blurred
the line between public and private interests. Politicians use
them to scare up votes based on fear of crime. Impoverished
rural areas reap financial benefits from the jobs created.156
Private (and not so private) companies exploit the $35 billion
prison budget for substantial profits. UNICOR (the acronym-like
name used by Federal Prison Industries), for example, is a
government corporation/ manufacturing conglomerate created in
1934 by the U.S. Department of Justice with the Federal Bureau
of Prisons. In federal fiscal year 1996, UNICOR employed 17,379
inmates and had $495.4 million in sales, 61.6 percent of which
went to the Department of Defense.157 Workers are paid from $.23
to $1.15 per hour. A portion of these wages are applied to
court-ordered fines, victim restitution, and other courtassessed obligations. Not a single cent of UNICOR’s money goes
for social security tax or any form of insurance. Nor does it
help to defray the expenses of our vast prison system or the
taxes we pay to support it.158 The U.S. prison system has become
a major bureaucratic, political, and economic resource, subject
to all of the surreptitious dealings and injustice that go along
with it.
Secondly, the percentage of inmates serving time for
nonviolent drug offenses has more than doubled since the early
1980s, to 61 percent in the federal prison system and 30 percent
in state systems. Some of these cases involve possession of only
small amounts of marijuana or cocaine.159 Yet, the average
sentence for a first-time, nonviolent drug offender is longer
than the average sentence for rape, child molestation, bank
robbery, or manslaughter. Our prisons are not overcrowded
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because of necessity but because hegemonic self-interests find
it profitable to keep them that way. To further contextualize
the situation, it is also necessary to realize that, despite the
$17 billion the United States is spending on the “war on drugs,”
the damage done by illicit drugs does not come close to that
caused by legal drugs like alcohol and tobacco. In 1989 alone,
tobacco killed 395,000 Americans and cocaine killed 3,618. A
recent issue of the New England Journal of Medicine (1998)
reported that properly prescribed legal drugs kill 106,000
Americans every year. That’s twenty times more than are killed
by illegal drugs.160
Thirdly, increased criminalization is simply not working.
For example, a meta-analysis of systematic assessments of
“tough” delinquency programs and institutionalization found that
these types of programs, such as “shock incarceration” and
“scared straight,” produce higher, not lower, levels of
recidivism.161 California now gives youthful offenders tougher
sentences than adults convicted of the same crime. According to
the California Department of Corrections, juveniles convicted of
murder serve an average of five years in prison, compared to
adult murderers who serve an average of three-and-a-half years.
Yet youth homicide rates went from 350, which was below the
national average in 1970, to 1400, or double the national
average, by 1992.162 “Get tough” policies ignore the fact that
the socialization of the prison system, where violence,
extortion, and rape are routine, often promotes a career in
crime and little else.163
Fourthly, the market economy requires a high percentage of
persistent poverty, which has serious consequences for children,
families, and society. As Friedman and Fisher explain:
Because a basic operating principle of market society is to
keep the public sector small, individuals and families are
forced to rely on individual efforts to secure some of the
basics of healthy human development that less Darwinian
societies, even poorer ones, provide much more reliably and
accessibly. Poor but relatively generous societies,
accordingly, are likely to do a better job at keeping
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violent crime low than wealthy but mean-spirited ones.164
Persistent poverty and the lack of opportunities for lucrative
employment play a crucial role in crime, which is often a
proactive result of complex and rational choices.165 It is
telling that Schwedinger and Schwedinger166 report that over
half of all U.S. prison inmates, in the year before their
arrest, earned no income at all, and one-third had an income of
less than $2,000. Under- and unemployment, obstacles associated
with racism (such as reducing federal aid to cities and poor
families), and the deteriorating position of marginalized groups
in the labor market have virtually eliminated the possibility of
their obtaining funds in any legitimate way. All but the very
top and lowest bottom rungs on the (albeit mythical) ladder of
opportunity have been removed along with the social safety net.
There is no way to climb out of poverty.
Conclusion
The previous pages have begun to illustrate some of the
paradoxes and perversions of a system that condemns violence to
garner votes, punishes victims in the name of justice,
scapegoats schools to camouflage its own crimes, and promotes
prejudice under the guise of fairness. However, the “problem” of
violence, like its “solution,” runs even deeper than these. It
courses through the veins of our body politic. It is inseparable
from the roots of violence in American society—a cultural icon
inextricably linked with history, entertainment, and economics.
We admire the vigilante, glorify the gangster, idolize the
gunslinger. Unless we come to grips with our past we cannot
understand our present and envision the possibilities for
reclaiming our future.
Our country was built on transgressive acts of violence
that continue to this day.167 It is part of the “otherist,”168
hegemonic American ideology to counter aggression with more
aggression. The narratives of our violent past and present are
turned into heroic epics, romanticizing danger and negating
empathy, emotion, and pain. These myths create a deceptive
fraternal nostalgia (sometimes called “patriotism”) that
reinscribes socially
sanctioned sentiments as
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history. From the minute Columbus set foot on Caribbean soil and
the extermination of native populations began, through the
savagery of slavery and its aftermath, the frequently forceful
resistance to the labor movement and civil rights, and the
continuing violence against immigrants and other minorities such
as homosexuals, the archaic and barbaric colonial and
capitalistic mindset that drives U.S. domestic and foreign
policies and practices has taken us down the path of disparity,
denial, and devastation.
The combination of this legacy with(in) the positivist
paradigm, has led to the development of “interventions” in the
“war(s) against fill-in-the-blank” (e.g., violence, guns,
drugs). Although these proposed solutions may be well
intentioned, violence, when viewed through the “scientific” or
logical positivist paradigm and the dominant ideology (the two
are intertwined), focuses on its prediction and control, which
is often a thinly disguised effort to homogenize youth so they
conform to hegemonic ideals.
Positivism refers to a paradigm, or belief system, that
claims objectivity, truth, and certainty exist in science and
that scientific knowledge is irrefutable and universal.
Positivists, contrary to more critical thinkers, do not consider
science a social construction that reflects a particular
ideology.169 Instead, positivism is deterministic, embracing
control and prediction "[without taking] into account that human
behavior is meaningful behavior that involves active agents with
intentions and expectations and able to communicate with other
equally active agents.”170 Positivism, by definition, rules out
asking questions about domination and agency. Comte, who is
often considered its founder, says the task of positivism is to
maintain the status quo, to “imbue the people with the feeling
that...no political change is of real importance.”171
This “scientized” position, or embrace of positivistic
objectivity and determinism, continues to dominate U.S. rhetoric
and policy on violence, as exemplified in the popularity of
“tough” deterrents (i.e., punishment) which promise solutions
they cannot and do not deliver. (Positivism and the
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scientization of the social sciences is further discussed in
chapter 8.) Furthermore, ignoring the ideological and social
processes of violence by relying on an ethos of capitalist
individualism and penal sanctions, in effect, punishes the true
victims of violence by targeting populations labeled “high crime
risks,” “dangerous,” and “subversive.” Not surprisingly, given
this country’s racist propensities, the majority of these groups
are young, poor, and people of color.
Alternatively, the authors of this volume maintain that
onto-historical concerns are central to developing
understandings of social phenomena. An onto-historical focus on
violence situates it within the relationship between self and
society, agency and control, power and structure. It
demythologizes scientism and argues for understanding knowledge
as embedded in the social, cultural, historical, and political
milieu in which it is produced. It is grounded in theory, not
ideology.
This position is not popular. It has been disparagingly
called idealistic, unrealistic, and, with echoes of McCarthyism
and all that implies, communistic. It has been discredited in
public discourse and policy about violence by Wilson172 and
others173 who argue that locating the causes of crime in
conditions of social and economic disadvantage has limited value
and offers almost no possibility of “practical applications“ for
intervention. But their practical applications, many of which
are discussed in the final chapter of this book, have proven
useless. Despite decades of rhetoric and a variety of
(superficial) interventions, violence and crime persist. They
are using a coat of paint to repair a building with a faulty
foundation. It is a cosmetic attempt, a diversion, an easy way
out. Yet, these superficial “practical” solutions gain
increasing support while approaches grounded in theoretical (as
opposed to ideological) bases are dismissed as unimportant and
criticized for being neither empirical nor practical when, to
the contrary, theory is both empirical and practical, as well as
necessary. Theory and practice are inextricably interwoven.
Practice is the basis of theory and theory is the means of
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changing practice.
Given this relationship, it becomes apparent why, as
Stanley and Wise observe, “Most of us have been brought up to
think of theory as something arcane, mysterious, and rather
forbidden.”174 We think of theory as beyond our reach, unless
“we” happen to be one of the elite (i.e., “intelligent,”
affluent, white, male). What we are not taught is that this way
of thinking is a manifestation of ideology.175 Ideology,
following Marx, refers to the beliefs of the dominant class that
are used to “rationalize” its vested interests and maintain the
status quo.176 Ideology has little, if any, systematic analysis
of the actual socioeconomic, political, or cultural mechanisms
prevalent in a society. It is a worldview that serves a
normative function.
Theory, on the other hand, is thoroughly grounded in data.
Without theory, data is incomprehensible. Theory explains the
relationships among a set of concepts or phenomena in a
meaningful way. It is defined as “explanation based on
observation and reasoning” and as “principles.” It can inform a
more democratic, humanistic, and successful future practice
instead of perpetuating present practices (based on ideology,
not theory) that simply do not work.
Denial of theory allows the dominant ideology to obscure
its role in practice both methodologically and in the generation
of knowledge. This makes it difficult to question the status quo
which keeps a majority of Americans at an unjust disadvantage.
In other words, the causes of violence in our society elude many
of us because those at the top do not want us to see them. They
prefer to play the "blame game," making it appear that others
are at fault. Opportunistic politicians have jumped on the
ba[n]dwagon of perfidious sentiment, convincing many that
violence is caused by (1) deterioration of the nuclear family
(while they repeatedly vote down measures for child care, etc.,
that would help families), (2) teenage pregnancy (when evidence
shows that teenage pregnancy rates have declined steadily since
the 1950s177 and that, in fact, the vast majority of fathers in
“teen” pregnancies are older men, many of whom are guilty of
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rape and transmitting AIDS),178 (3) welfare dependency (these
politicians have led many Americans to believe that welfare is a
major part of the United States budget when, in fact, basic
welfare programs combined [Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, Supplemental Security Income, and Food Stamps] amount
to only 3.4 percent of the federal budget),179 and (4) moral
decay (have they looked at the behavior of their own group
lately?). It is not an accident that they divide and scapegoat
vulnerable groups. These tactics assure that the tables of power
are not turned by diverting attention from the sins of the
powerful and laying them on the heads of groups whose access to
recourse they prohibit. This book means to expose the
ideological frameworks supporting these tables of power—not so
they can be turned, but so they can be replaced with tables
built of more democratic wood rooted in the solid theoretical
ground of a socially just society.
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